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Letters to the Editor 
To the Editor, 
Regarding the article on, "Definition and 
Criteria of Clinical Death", (November, 1973, 
Rizzo and Yonder) I would comment as 
follows: 
I am unwilling to concede that " human" 
means anything less than the fullness that its 
definition impl ies. To indicate that to be 
" human" is more neocortex than vegetative, 
or, perhaps more self-consciousness than 
feeling, o r more soul than body, etc., is to 
stumble into the very error that plagues us 
in the philosophical approach to the problem 
of abortion. To be "human" is to be a ll and 
probably a great deal more of the afo re-
mentioned albeit in varying degrees and a t 
varying times in the course of a human life 
span. Is the badly retarded child who has 
neither, "the capacity" nor, "the potential" 
for "higher mental function" fo r "reflective 
consciousness", to become a living bank fo r 
spare o rgans because he lacks that pote ntial? 
The thinking reflected in this article is 
somewhat analagous to. what is becoming 
increasingly fashionable in papers published 
by the Hasting Institute and in other ethic<tl 
literature. Here , for some unspecified reason, 
there is a distinction between being "human" 
and being "fully human" or, "totally human". 
Is a being that ·is human ever less than fully 
or totally human? Obviously not. To be 
human implies a totality, a unicity that neither 
is made more human by adding an adjective 
nor less so by Oplitting it. 
I would argue strenuously with friends 
Rizzo and Yonder. against accepting as a 
criterion fo r a so-called "upgrading" of clini· 
cal criteria for death, "the need" of one 
human as over against the needs of the poten-
tial donor. Laudable and pragmatic as the 
ends intended may be, they do not justify 
less than scrupulously applied means. 
The primordial principle holding the 
absolute value of any one human's life, re· 
gardless of its c urrent condition must be 
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maintained as a totally unnegotiable 
no t only in this instance out in the ah 
issue and in all other related medicah 
situations. 
The second reason for "upgradin1 
criteria, viz, the "family's hardship" i ~ 
v~lid objective reason to tamper w, 
Harvard criteria . . 
In summary, the only safeguard fl 
protecting an individual under any 
circumstances and at any time is to dr 
most stringent set of criteria possible 
protectioo of a human life. There is n< 
short of heaven that transcends this 
absolute. 
Sincerely, 
Vitale H. PaganeUi, M.D. 
66 Park Street 
Glens Falls, New York 
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I have with me a copy of your \ ugust 
Issue of Linacre Quarterly. I read '. with 
great interest. Would you be kind en• >gh. to 
send me the other issues so that I c n bmd 
them up and keep in our library? I shall 
highly appreciate if you could enroll me as a 
subscriber of this magazine. . 
We have over a thousand member hospl· 
tals in our Association as members. A journal 
of the philosophy and Ethics of Medical 
Prac t ice will be of great help to me in giving 
guidance and direction to our members. 
Please do the needful fo r which I shall be 
immensely grateful. 
Yours sincerely, 
Fr. Emmanuel A. Pallikunnen, V.C. 
Execufive Director 
Catho lic Hospital Association 
New Delhi, India 
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The Philosophical R ots in 
Western Culture fer the 
Pro-Abortion Stand 
Donald DeMarco, Ph.D. 
Every Westerne r, from the mo-
ment he begins to learn, is ex-
posed to the unseen danger of be-
coining 'Western'ized'. T o become 
'Westernized' is to have achieved 
the infelicitous combination of a 
deep unawareness of the intellec-
tual presuppositions of Western 
thought, and an authoritative pos-
ture that betrays complete confi-
dence in their validity. When per-
vasive, this form of intellectual 
somnolence is critical because it 
prevents a people from properly 
understanding its culture and there· 
fore from making needed correc-
tions and improvements. A modern-
ized Socratic admonition might 
read: "The unexamined culture is 
llot worth pe rpetuating." 
Dr. DeMarco is an assistant pro· 
lessor of philosophy at St. Jerome's 
College, Waterloo, Ontario. In this 
article he details the five major 
Philosophical schools which he 
/e~[s have shaped the pro-abortion 
''
11nd. His e.valuation and criti· c~m of each school provide new 
diseussion grounds for those who 
defend the pro·lzfe movement. 
May, 1974 
The abortion debate offers a 
case in point where it is com-
mon to find assertions treated 
as axiomatic while their presup· 
positions are regarded as non-exis-
tent. It would help bring a measure 
of respectability to the intellec-
tual discourse on this most impor· 
tant and controversial subject, if 
the philosophical roots in Western 
thought which have shaped the 
major part of the pro-abortionists' 
intellectual thrust could be un-
covered, understood and evaluated 
within a realistic as well as Western 
framework. 
Five major philosphical roots 
are set forth. They are: Atomism, 
Cartesianism, Existentialism, Em-
piricism, and Sociologism. To dem-
onstrate that these roots have in_-
deed shaped the pro-abortion mind, 
appropriate citations from the writ· 
ings of significant pro-abortionists 
are presented. To help provide 
both illuminating criticism and a 
broader intellectual perspective, 
rejoinders are offered closing the 
treatment of each philosphical root. 
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Atomism 
T· history of Atomism beg ins 
in a 1ent Greece with Democritus, 
who believed that indivisible units 
called atoms (in Greek 'atom' means 
uncuttable) were the ultimate build-
ing blocks of the physical universe. 
He reasoned that if these atoms 
were unveiled , they would reveal 
the secret of matter and explain th e 
Jaws governing its behavio r. 
The histo ry of science from De-
mocritus to the theories o f atomic 
physics in the 20th century chron-
icles the continuing drama of this 
search for the a'tom. Successive 
discoveries by such men as Dalton, 
Mendeleyev, Rutherford , Bohr, 
Fermi and others provided in-
creasing credibility for the exis-
te nce of atoms. So convincing grew 
the idea that these indivisible units 
constituted reality that Atomism 
was transplanted from its natural 
soil in matter to a more ethereal 
home in society. 
People were gradually liberated, 
thanks .to the general spirit of 
Atomism, from thinking of them-
selves as belonging essentially to 
a class or a group, a church or a 
community; and took pride in the 
idea that they were, like atoms, 
e ntities unto themselves. Public 
and private life became mo re clear-
ly distinguishable from each other, 
as did public and private morality. 
The Renaissance period and the 
Age of Enlightenment offered man 
a heightened sense of individuality 
and new reason to take pride in 
his personal accomplishments. Rug-
ged Individualism evolved; Laissez-
faire capitalism flourished; the Age 
of the Common Man arrived. The 
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individual had been born 
atomism was o ne of the hand 
who assisted at his delivery. 
In order to secure individ 
rights were instituted . The I 
ing fathers wrote the · consti 
of the United States inspir 
such thinkers as lio bbes , I 
and Ro usseau , all of whose pt 
thinking was strongly inflt 
by Ato mism. Rights becan 
solute because individuali t· 
the absolute essential ch. 
o f man . Just .as what was esse 
real in the physical univen 
believed to be the individ t 
atom, so too, what was es' 
ly real in human society \\ 
lieved to be the highly indi 
ized man. 
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The less individualized mt tbers 
of socie ty accorded unlimite adu-
lation and envy to the sel made 
man, the star, the man of 'con-
spicuous consumption-", tht man 
o f property, the ' to p do~ . the 
tycoon. 
Atomism and Abortion 
The woman who conceives her-
self as primarily an individual in-
sists that she be given the fr..::edom 
to maintain that individuali ty. This 
freedom is logically extended to 
give her sovereignty over all aspects 
of her sexuality and reproductivity. 
Margaret Sanger declared in 1920, 
"No woman can call herself free 
who does not own and control 
her body. No woman can call her-
self free until she can choose con-
sciously whether she will or will 
_·not be a mother."l 
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Viewing the fetus as part of the 
woman's body, psychiatrist Thomas 
Szasz regards abortion as a crime 
"without victims": 
During the first two to three mo nths 
gestation (when most abortions are per-
formed), the embryo c a nnot live outs ide 
the womb. It may therefo re be con-
sidered part of the woman's body. If 
so, there o ught to be no specific laws 
regulating abortion. Such a n operat ion 
should be available in the same way as, 
say, an operatio n for the beautificat ion 
of a nose.2 
In a similar vein, women's liber-
ationist Alice S. Rossi writes: 
The passage of ... a · refo rm statute is 
only one step on the way to the goa l of 
maximum individ~al freedom for men 
and women to control their own repro-
ductive lives. Such freedom should in· 
elude the perso nal right to undo a con· 
traceptive failure by means of a the ra· 
peutic abortion . . .. 3 
Phrased in the negative, freed o m 
to maintain one's individuality be-
comes freedom from sexual servi-
tude. Dorothy Kanyon, former 
municipal-court judge of New Yo rk 
exclaims, "For a state to fo rce a 
w~man to bear a child against her 
Wtll is outrageous. "4 Lawrence 
Lader adds 
' To force these women to bear a c hild 
against their will, as a result of contra-
ceptive failure , becomes the cruelest 
and most illogical sente nce that society 
can inflict.5 
Abortion, insofar as it protec ts 
a woman's individuality is seen as 
a private matter. Dr. Lawrence 
Kolb, · professor of law, writes: 
~aving an abortion is usually a very 
~vate matter. ... A wo man's right to 
Jlnvacy included her right to decide 
tvhether she would bear a child she 
bad conceived.s 
W Dr. Alice Thompson, Dean of 
omen at Westford College, under-
~Y. 1974 
scores th 
tion: 
r ivate nature of ab<. 
Even 
option 1 
ought 
that she 
, he never considered the 
uon) and never used it. she 
matter o f principle know 
' uld. To deny her this r ight 
is a viol; . .,, o f her freedom as a person.7 
I 
The fetus. vie wed as part of the 
women 's individuality, logically 
becomes her property to be dis-
posed as she sees fit. Philosopher 
Ti-Grace Atkinso n states that "Both 
her (the pregnan t women's) repro-
ductive function and the fetus 
constitute her property ."8 Women's 
liberationist Barbara Sykes Wright, 
member of the National Organiza-
tion for Women (NOW), adds: 
Therefore I, a nd thousands upon tho u-
sands of wo men like me , believe that 
any law forbidd ing an abortion under 
good medical cond itio ns is immoral 
and in additio n unconstitutional, fo r it 
violates her right to contro l her prope rty 
- her body-as well as her life, liberty 
and happiness.9 
Applying the gene ral philosphy 
of Atomism to the fetus, we easily 
see how the developing child could 
be interpreted as a threat to the 
individuality of the mother, es-= 
pecially when the mo ther does no t 
conceive of her individuality in 
terms of involvement with a child. 
In addition, individual rights, be-
cause they safeguard that which is 
primary in man, are themselves 
primary. Therefore, an unwanted 
fetus, by interfering with a woman's 
individuality, wo uld be violating 
her primary right to individuality. 
Rejoinder 
If the primary and essential char-
acter of man is his individuality, 
then the playwright i_s correct when 
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he s '> , "Hell is other people ." 
HUJr 1 experience, however, shows 
lonc11 ness to be the most unbear-
able pain man suffers; it shakes the 
very depths of his soul. The sense of 
what psychologists call "no-related-
ness" is felt at the center of man's 
nature because man is destined to 
be more than an a to mic unit. 
The basic truth that man is in-
cl ined by nature to transcend the 
atomicity of individuality has been 
symbolized in many ways through-
out history: In the Hindu "ta t 
tvam asi" (that a rt T hou); the 
pagan myth of the androgyn (the 
man-woman); and the C hristian 
Triune God (F ather-Son-Holy 
Spirit). T he ancient Greeks lacked 
a word to distinguish private from 
public morality. T he Roma ns 
ta ught that one man alone was no 
man at all . Modern philosophers of 
Personalism present man as essen-
tially related to another in an "I-
T hou" dynamic reciprocity. 
If th~ need to overcome single-
ness through love, care a nd com-
munication is rooted in man's 
nature, then the atomic picture of 
man is a false one. 
Cartesianism 
Rene Descartes, a 17th Century 
mathematician, came to philosophy 
with a sacred mission : to rescue 
philosophical thought from the 
shipwreck of sceptic ism and es-
tablish it once for all on the firm 
ground of indubitable certitude. 
He reasoned that philosophy would 
be preserved for all time if it 
could begin with a premise that 
was undeniably true and proceed 
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unerringly according to a rig< •US 
mathematical methodology. 
The beginning was everyt tg. 
Unless built upon a bedroc of 
certitude , the whole edific of 
philosophy would ul timately t m-
ble . Descartes set ··about his 
search for such a beginnin by 
refusing to take anything fo r mt-
ed . He doubted everything. ' he 
basis for his true philosophy • uld 
ha ve to pass the most seven est. 
Applying his methodic doul he 
soon realized tha t althoug he 
could doubt . everything els he 
could not doubt the fact that t was 
doubting. 
· fhus he struck upon one the 
most fa mous of all philost tical 
assertions: "I think , theref e I 
am" (Cogito ergo sum). Des rtes' 
e xplication of his "Cogito " r s as 
fo llows: It cannot be doubte that 
I think. Furthermore, it is p c ise· 
ly this capacity to think that gives 
me the assurance that I exi!> T his 
is how I am ~ssentially di erent 
from substances that can't hink. 
I am a thinking thing and oth r sub· 
stances which lack this c< oacity 
to think are mere extended· hings. 
The double significance pf Car· 
tesian thinking to this d iscussion 
is the identification of what man 
is (his essence or nature) with con· . 
sciousness, and the dualism by 
which body (e.xtended thing) and 
mind (thinking thing) are classified 
as separate entities. 
The influence of Descartes can· 
not be overestimated . Nearly all 
historians of philoso phy agree that 
he fully deserves the title 'Father of 
Modern Philosophy' . Without some 
Linacre Quarterly 
understanding of Descartes, mod-
ern thought is incomprehensible. 
Cartesianism and Abortion 
Philosopher Michael Tooley of 
Stanford University, wntmg in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, em· 
ploys a self-consciousness test to 
determine when a member of a 
species has a right to live.IO 
Professor P. F . Strawson points 
out that it is not unusual for people 
to regard consciousness as the 
identifying predicate of person.11 
Moralist Joseph Fletcher so 
strongly supports a dualistic separa-
tion of moral pe rsonality from the 
body that Germain Grisez suggests 
his being "influenced by the mind-
body dualism of seventeenth-cen-
tury and eighteenth-century philos· 
ophy."12 For Fletcher, neither per-
SOnhood nor moral status are predi-
cates of the consciousness-lacking 
human body. 
. .. a fetus is not a moral or personal 
being since it lacks freedom, self·deter· 
mination, rationality, the ability to choose 
either means or ends, and knowledge of 
its circumstances. IS 
· · . a patient who has completely lost 
the power to communicate has passed 
into a submoral state, outside the forum 
of conscience and beyond moral being.14 
. According to Fletcher, "person" 
IS non-existent in the absence of 
the synthesizing function of the 
cerebral cortex and before cerebra-
tion is in play .15 
. In· a· highly publicized incident 
In 1962, Mrs. Sherri Finkbine, who . 
had ingested thalidomide during 
the second month of pregnancy, 
was denied a legal abortion in her 
home state of Arizona. Fearing 
that the fetus she was carrying 
May, 1974 
would b ?formed, she obta in d 
a legal a ion in Sweden. In sup-
port of ; r mother's decision . 
T err ie F- >ine writes, "A man can 
think, d :'1, hope, and love. A 
fetus ca 16 
Apph 1 Cartesianism to the 
fetus, W l: conclude that since the 
fetus appare ntly lacks conscious-
ness . it has no essential claim to 
being human. Also, the fact that 
body is not reducible to spirit nor 
matter reducible to consciousness 
precludes the fetus's being human. 
T herefore, to abort a fe tus is no t 
taking a human life. 
Rejoinder 
Rev. Charles Carroll , former 
Executive Director of the Cente r 
for Human Values in the Health 
Scie nces at the University of Cali-
fo rnia at San Francisco, writes: 
T he wise ma n faces the fact that be ing 
precedes thought and, examining Des· 
cartes' popularly accepted dic tum, 
Cogito, ergo sum, he wonders if the truth 
is not more likely reflected in Sum, ergo 
cogito, or better yet in Sum, ergo cogito, 
ergo aestimo - " I am, I think, I value ." 
Surely, being precedes thought; and being 
and thought precede value.17 
The Carte sia n p a rtition o f 
thought and thing, soul and body, · 
mind and matter, has taken its 
toll from modern man in various 
forms of intellectual schizophrenia, 
moral puritanism, and what Ralph 
Barton Perry has termed, "the ego-
centric predicament". 
The historical results of Carte-
sianism show conclusively that the 
separation of thought from what is 
thought causes man to lose his 
sense of feeling "at home" in the 
world. It has also led to the sub-
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ject· .m of Kant, the idealism of 
He~ and the scepticism of Hume. 
~ J Descartes based his philos-
oph'< on "I love, therefore we are", 
"l feel, therefore I am"; " I care, 
therefore I am human", or even " I 
rebel, therefore we are", he would 
have affirmed not only the self but 
the self in creative dialogue with 
"the other". Rather , Descartes in-
carcerated his philosophy in the 
sterility of the closed ego. 
The logical philosophical anti-
dotes to Cartesian egoism are: 
Heidegger's philosophy of "care" 
(Sorge), Blondel's " integral real-
ism", Buber's primary word " 1-
Thou", Whitehead's "organismic 
philosophy", Marcel's "creative 
fidelity", Kierkegaard's "leap of 
faith", and Maritain's "knowledge 
through connaturality". 
Existentialism 
The most popular and influen-
tial of all the innume rable forms of 
existentialism has been the one 
explicated by Jean-Paul Sartre. 
becomes the basic charal 
of the being who is convent 
called man. "Being-for-h 
is incomplete and seeks, 1 
his conscious free cho ices, 1 
come his incompleteness, 
himself in time, and ·. ach1• 
essence. 
The relation between f 
and essence, therefore , is 
It is only through freedom 
authentic expression in free 
that the "etre-pou~soi" il 
an essence . . One might as 
was the "etre-pou~soi" br 
achieved a n essence. 
response is well known: "E~ 
precedes essence." One is 
man, o r man, or animal, 
stance, or anything at a t 
it can make itself or ach1 
essence through free choice 
While the details of 
philosophy are not widely 
his doctrine of the essent 
portance of freedom has 
widely circulated and deep 
1stic 
tally 
,elf' 
lUgh 
•ver-
fine 
an 
dom 
Jcial. 
d its 
10ice 
ieves 
what 
re it 
rtre's 
ence 
hu-
su b-
until 
e its 
rtre's 
lQWn, 
1 im· 
been 
felt . 
In addition to winning wide acclaim Existentialism and Abort 10 
for his core of philosophical writ- Ashley Montagu formu la ·s his 
ings, Sartre has reached broad notion of humanity as well as his 
political , literary, and theater audi- defense of abortion by an L xpres· 
e nces through the dramatic means sion as significant and st ..:cinct 
of his novels, plays, essays, and as Sartre's "Existence prt cedes 
political statements. He has, in essence." He writes: "Hu(nanity 
fact, amassed so strong an inte r- is an achievement, not an endow· 
national ·reputat ion that in many ment."18 
circles his thinking has come to Sartre's long time frie nd and 
be identified with existentialism. philosophical associate Simone 
At the center of Sartre's existen- de Beauvoir reiterates the position 
tialism is a radically novel concept that it is only through free choices 
of man. Foregoing use of the word that value and essence can be cre-
'man', Sartre chooses the expression ated. Accon;lingly, the fetus is yet 
"being-for-himself" (Etre-pou~soi). to be valued; yet to achieve an 
"Desiring to make himself" thus . essence. 
92 Linacre Quarterly 
Creative acts o ngmating in liberty 
establish the object" as value and give 
it the quality o f the essential; whereas 
the child in the maternal body is not 
thus justified; it is no t only a grat uito us 
cellular growth , a brute fact of nature 
as contingent on circumstances as 
death and corresponding philosophically 
with it.19 
In Sartrean existentialism the 
purity of the free ch oice determines 
an action's morality. Dr. David R. 
Mace, an abortion psychologist, 
exemplifies this philosophy in 
counselling his clients. "It doesn' t 
really matter what Hele n decided ," 
. he writes. "Take your destiny into 
your own two hands," a nd make a 
choice you can live with comfort-
ably in the coming years. He adds , 
underscoring the subjective aspect 
oft~~ pregnant woman's agonizing 
dectsJon, " ... try to weigh the issues, 
and then list the three options in the 
order that seems best for you. •>20 
_Presbyterian theo logian Herbert 
Rtebardson, emphasizing the im-
ponance of free cho ice in the deter-
mination of the nature of the 
fetus, writes: 
Indeed, within his value system (the 
Ptrson who has already accepted the 
~alue of t~chnical control over sexual 
ife) the pnmary mark of the humanity 
of the fetus is precisely that it is wanted 
and voluntarily created-not that it is 
llllwanted, but somehow biologically 
~plete. It is precisely his choosing 
exclude 
pregnan( 
But 
always 
to abo, 
should 
males. 
burden of unwan l. I 
.: idents happen- and tht., 
women should be alloweJ 
c r a ll, in the 1970s, females 
he same sexual freedom as 
Autht. .ana Clarke Phelan and 
Patricia l ha esa Maginnis under-
score lhe esse ntial priority of career 
freedom over compulsory preg-
nancies: 
Abnrloon laws (that is, anti-abortion 
laws) arc woman-control laws, or chatlel 
law~. if you prefer . ... 
Forced by law into unending pregnan-
cies and child care and rearing, most 
women had absolutely no opportunity 
to free their energies or money fo r 
other occupations.23 
Application of Sartre's existen-
tialistic conception of freedom and 
his doctrine of "etre-pour-soi'' to 
the fetus, would make it appear that 
si nce the fetus has no freedom to 
overcome its incompleteness by 
making choices, it totally lacks any 
claim to essence o r nature. More-
over, a fetus is not human where 
it was conceived by accident o r 
through force since its value and 
essence could not originate apart 
from the creative liberty of the con-
ceiving woman . Thus abortion, ac-
cording to Sartrean thinking would 
not constitute taking the life of a 
human being. 
ll that creates his sense of responsibility Rejoinder 
for preserving its life.2t T he principle "existence pre-
Sexual and career freedoms are cedes essence" can be taken only ~ viewed as impo rtant enough metaphorically. I t is one thing to 
10 JUStify abortion. Dr. He nry Mor- say that nobody ever fulfills all of ~~tal~r of Montreal, who admits his potential. But it is quite another 
Wornavmg aborted more than 6,500 to say that a pe rson has no essence 
a en between 1969 and 1973, at all until be fulfills a certain 
rgues that sexual freedom should _ a mount of that potential. (What-
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evf that amount is remains un-
Spl ied. Sartre contends that if 
01 , did fulfill all of his needs he 
w• uld become a "being-in-itself" 
("etre-en-soi") deprived of needs, 
freedom and consciousness). 
sica! 
scientists, since both have < Jbid· 
ing enthusiasm for the ob~ 1able 
and describable. Also thL con-
a llied themselves with 
If there can be existence without 
essence, what is it , then, that 
exists? Existence doesn't exist. 
Whatever exists must be someth ing 
other than existence itself. T his 
othe r something is the essence, 
nature , meaning or structure of 
that which does exist. Therefore, 
existence and essence are really 
contemporaneous; they have no 
reality apart from one another. 
T he fact that man is never fully 
developed, or fully free , o r fully 
conscious does not mean that he 
is devoid of essence, nature, mean-
ing, or structure. It is pe rfectly 
reasonable to suppose, as do many 
contemporary psychotherapists , 
that the meaning of man is to be 
always in the process of becoming. 
Nothing in this . whole world is 
ever static , unchanging, or per-
fectly fulfi lled. Furthermore, the 
nature of the existing fetus is in-
trinsically determined and is not 
conferred or withheld by the purity 
of his mother's free choice or by 
the degree of wantedness she at-
taches to her pregnancy. 
tinually have prided them!. 
opposing the armchair phil· 
who creates a world of dre< 
dogmas that are empiric: 
verifiable. 
es in 
>pher. 
" and 
un· 
Because empiricist philt phers 
have e mphasized observa and 
describable experience, t1 ' are 
known as 'realist' philo phers. 
The 'sensism' of David H t e, the 
'utilitarianism' of John Stu Mill, 
the 'pragmatism' of John ewey, 
the 'positivism' of Ernst M ; 1, and 
the 'language picture tht ·y' of 
Ludwig Wittgenstei~ are t few 
significant la ndmarks in t ! pro-
tean history of modern E mJ ·icism. 
These schools have vehemt tly op· 
posed less positivistic phil• ophies 
dealing with matte rs such meta· 
physics, God, and moral values. 
By applying the princ .tes of 
E mpiricism to the fetus , e note 
that the fetus · is not a be · g with 
whom an adult can visual " iden· 
tify, especially in the earl stages 
of fetal development. In tht zygote, 
blastula or gastrula stagl ,, what 
can be observed, described or ex· 
perienced has virtually nothing . in 
common with the human be!O& 
known outside the womb. The 
Empiricism 
Empiricism is the broad area of 
philosophical thought dedicated to 
the perennially variated theme of 
'seeing is believing'. The cardinal 
principle underlying Empiricism 
is that whatever sensation cannot 
verify is simply unverifiable. Em-
pirical philosophers have always 
assertion that the fetus has an un· 
observable soul which gives it a 
sacred value is purely c onjectural 
by empiricist principles . 
Empiricism and Abortion 
Stric t empiricists reject as an 
unscientific speculation (if not as 
laughable) the claim that the micro-
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scopic fertilized ovum is a human 
being. They say that the embryo 
at any stage is "merely a blob of 
protoplasm", or "a parasite", or 
something going through a "fish 
stage" of development.24 In addi-
tion, they label it a "product of 
conception" (Los Angeles Abortion 
Symposium, 197 1 ); mere "tissue" 
(a Johns Hopkins pro fessor of 
medicine), and a "growth" (a New 
York city abort ion co unse lo r). 
Fleming _and Bee be state that until 
quickening, it is a live cluste r of 
embryonic cells , and not a human 
being.25 
What makes it ·particularly dif-
ficult for the empirical minded 
individual to accord humanity to 
the fetus is the lack of a common 
observable basis which would 
identify the two . The adult who is 
observed to enjoy a whole network 
of relationships and a wide variety 
of experiences does not resemble 
the relatively inert fetus in the 
least. As Rudolf Gerber notes: 
··· no comparison exists between ari 
ldult acting in the wo rld and a n unborn 
fetus who has mo nths to travel befo re 
achieving his fi rst social act at birth .26 
Sarvis and Rodman reflect a 
similar empiricist tendency whe n 
they write: 
It is much easier to empathize with 
Ill adult woman who strongly wants an 
~~ion o r with a wo man who has been 
IDJUred as a result of a criminal abortion 
tbaa it is to identify with an unseen 
fetus .27 
. Thus, aborting a fetus is not ta k-
tng a human life, because what is 
~ribed by the ordinary empiri-
experience of man does not 
COrrespond to what is described by 
an em · · f Pineal experience of the 
etus. 
~.1974 
'ejoinder 
The esst .tl limitation of Em-
piricism a~ all-inclusive philos-
ophy is th<. fails to justify itself. 
T he statem• ''Only what is sensed 
can be \t rtfied", itself 1s not 
sensed and therefore can no t be 
verified . We catch the radica l em-
piricist trymg hopelessly to jump 
over his own shadow. Einstein 
alluded to the limitations of Em-
piricism when he said that the most 
incom prehensible thi ng abo ut the 
universe is that it is comprehe n-
s ible. T hat by which a thing is 
known diffe rs radically fro m that 
which is known. T he measure a nd 
the thing measured are not o ne 
and the same. I t is quite possible 
to comprehend certai n universal 
laws and remain unable to com-
prehend that which allows com-
pre hens io n ; kn owledge o f th e 
process by which the universe is 
known. Furthe rmore, Empiricism 
does not get to the being of th ings, 
nor is it concerned with their most 
fu ndamental attributes. Goodness, 
love, beauty, and tru th- verities 
which nourish the very soul of 
man-transcend the limiting scope 
of the empiricist. 
It is necessary, therefore, that 
some truths exist beyond the fini te 
range of sense observation. Once 
we admit this necessity, we a re 
able to approach with respect the 
thesis that what makes a ma h to 
be man involves the spiritual. It 
is not how he is seen but what he 
is that makes man a man. 
The trouble adults have in iden-
tifying with the fetus is understand-
able. A similar empiricist bias 
has occurred historically through-
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1e entire field of medicine. 
tbert Liley writes: 
uecause the medicine of adults pre-
~.:Jed the medicine of the infant, neo-
nate and fetus, a tendency has grown up 
in fie lds from surgery to psychiatry to 
start with adult life and work backwards 
.... The net effect has been to consider 
the fetus and the neonate as a poorly 
functioning adult rather than as a splen· 
didly functioning baby.28 
Sociologism 
fication of a human being as 
ticipating in the pr.ocess of h 
zation through the sum h 
his inter-relationships with 
members of society ; and 2) 
buting to the general g( 
society. An individual's life 
human meaning or human jt 
tion whenever he- is pre 
whenever he is of "no social 
Ius value"; or wherever h 
good contradicts the gc 
society. 
par-
ani-
l of 
ther 
ntri-
l of 
s no 
fica-
.cia!; 
imu-
own 
of 
prin-
'etus, 
'etus, 
n; 2) 
·d in 
not 
fe of 
In applying the genera 
c iples of sociologism to th1 
we can appreciate that: 1) th 
being pre-social, is not bur 
the fetus, not being enga 
inter-social relationships, 
human; 3) the continuing 
the fetus, being detrimer 
the mother , family or com1 unity, 
does not merit legal protect n. 
Sociologism is an extension of 
sociology. It seeks to establish, 
on a sociological basis, both man's 
meaning and his justification. It 
is acutely aware that without the 
redeeming grace offered by society, 
man's life degenerates to what 
Thomas Hobbes called a "state of 
nature" where men are driven 
above all else by "a perpetual and 
restless desire for power after 
power that ceaseth only in death ." 
That which gives man a more e le-
vated station, grants him a wider Sociologism and Aborti n 
dimension , magnifies his impor- Dr. Edmund Overstreet pro-
tance, and refines his sensibilities fessor of obstetrics and gynL .:ology 
is society. In short, society human- at the Un iversity of Califo nia at 
izes man. Without the blessing of San Francisco, speaks ot legal 
society, man is either pre-human abortion as being no longer nerely 
(pre-socialized), or sub-human (un- a means of providing medical care, 
,socialized). but as a form of sociological care 
In recognizing society's human- for the community.
29 
Niagara Falls 
izing role toward the individual, abortionist Dr . K. Walker lpseud· 
sociologism does not ignore the onym- W . G ifford-Jones1 states 
welfare 'of the community. In fact , that he does abortions for "socio-
utilzing the axiom that the whole . logical reasons."
30 
Glanville Wil-
is greater tha n the part, sociolog- Iiams writes that calling a zygote a 
ism stresses that the good of society human being would be acceptable 
transcends the good of any one in- "if there we re no social conse-
dividual. Therefore, with the hu- quences of do ing so."
31 
I 
manization of man and the good Professor Garrett Hardin argues 
of society in mind, sociologism forcefully that restricting women 
interprets the meaning and justi- _ from obtaining legal abortions 
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would ul timately be "ruinous to 
the social system :32 
Is it good (for) a woman who does not 
want a child to bear one? An abundant 
literature in psycho logy and sociology 
proves that the unwanted c hild is a 
social danger. Unwanted children are 
more likely than others to g row up in 
psychologically unhealthy homes; they 
are more likely tha n othe rs to become 
delinquents, and ... whe n they become 
pare nts they are more likely than others 
to be poor parents themselves and breed 
another generation of unwanted chil-
dren .33 
Hardin contrasts abortion with 
co~pulsory pregancy and advises 
SOCiety to be more concerned about 
protecting itself . from the more 
~armful effects of the latter than 
m ~hastizing women for their oc-
castonal sexual indiscretions: 
_If (a woman) is pregnant against her 
""'11• does it matter to society whether or 
not she was careless o r unskillful in her 
use o f c~ntraception? In any case, she is 
th~eatenmg society with a n unwanted 
ch~d: for wh ich society will pay dearly.:u 
Wri ~llh~m Kopit and Harriet Pilpel, 
tmg m a working paper for the 
New c· ·1 · lVI L1berties Union Board 
ologf _Directors , echo similar socio-
ICal sentiments: 
The enormous social costs that the 
~esent 1965 abortion law c reate (sic) 
~ clearly an evil that far outweighs any 
nght to life that a fetus may be thought 
to possess.35 
th_ilosopher Lorenne Smith em-
p :aslzes a cardinal sociologistic 
P<>mt when h · ·f· s e JUStJ 1es abortion 
by appealing to the incalculable 
adv.antages abortion represents to 
SOciety: 
The advantages of abortion to parents 
llld children in low-income groups to 
•omen as lass . ' 
C
'- a c , to soc1ety as a whole 
"'arly · • th outwe1gh the d isadvantages to 
e aborted fetuses.36 
May, 1974 
There: 
of sociol 
a fetus, 
of socie' 
fetus do, 
threaten c 
good. 
· under the principl ·s 
,m, taking the life {lf 
is done in the intere:.t 
" not illicit since the 
ot possess the right to 
ontravene the common 
Rejoinder 
. If man's meaning and justifica-
tl?n for living are conferred upon 
him by society , then there is no 
substantial basis in real ity for such 
a conferral. Society, as such, does 
not have substantial being. Al-
though it answers a natural human 
need, society exists by convention 
0~ ag_reement. Man precedes so-
Ciety m actual existence. Thus, the 
state exists for the benefit of man 
who has substantial being, rathe; 
than man for the benefit of the 
state w~ich has its being through 
conventiOn or agreement. 
. T he argument that it is justi-
fiable to kill one in order to improve 
the lot of many is based on the 
fallacy that two lives are more im-
portant than one life. If each man's 
life is ~bsolute , that is to say, his 
e verythmg, then it is incomparable 
T hings can be compared to each 
othe r only whe n they have some-
thing in common. But the very 
thing one man does not have in 
common with another is his own 
center of existence upon which 
'his everything' is either allowed 
.to continue or is destroyed. Dos-
toevski has argued convincingly 
that man should not bargain for 
~ven a lasting and perfect utopia 
If the price were the torture of 
one innocent child. 
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selects a certain form of one-sid ·ss 
and magnifies it into a tota l 1.31 
T o ·scribe man as pre-soc ial-
ized .Jnsocialized is to speak of 
him , .n the outside of his being . 
Man·· human nature , although it 
flo UJsttes in a just society, is an 
inner essence and springs forward 
with the help of society no t by 
the power of society. 
It bas been the genius of the :st 
to divide a nd conquer. Each l he 
five preceding philosophies • ·e-
sents a one-sided and fragme t ed 
approach to reality. Atomism Ja· 
rates the individual from the m-
To abort an unwanted child 
because he might later prove to 
be a disadvantage to society is to 
treat the innocent with more 
severity than the guilty; to give 
more weight to a fearful hypothe-
sis than courage would allow, less 
hope for a positive reality than 
justice would require. 
Conclusion 
"Non omnes omnia possumus" 
(We cannot do everything for 
everyone) is a truism; however, it 
should not allow society to relax 
its efforts against the evil of one-
sidedness. Individuality, conscious-
ness, freedom, empirical scie nce, 
and societal needs are indeed 
significal')t , but when isolated 
from their complementary values 
and raised to a level of unique 
significance, they mere ly illustrate 
a c ulture's immaturity. Whereas 
individual one-sidedness may be 
helpful to a society in offsetting 
and counterbalancing other forms 
of individual one-sidedness, col-
lective one-sidedness is a different 
matter. Kierkegaard writes: 
munity and treats hi"! as obs •te. 
Cartesianism separates the go 
from the other and man from n tre, 
rendering their inter-relatior ips 
unaccountable. Existentialism ar-
trean) separates existence vm 
essence and makes freedor ..tb· 
solute . Empiricism separate· the 
material from the spiritua l tnd 
makes matter absolute. Socio/t sm 
separates the intrinsic fron lhe 
extrinsic and treats the ext tsic 
as absolute. 
If these varieties of W t. ern 
thought a re ever to be cure of 
their one-sidedness, they tust 
first be examined at their )int 
of origination. Many contemp· ary 
thinkers, having lost patience vith 
the materialistic· penchant o the 
West, have looked to the spi1 tual 
genius of the East to find the rue 
philosophy of life. Others 1ave 
sought a reconciliation of Ea..,tern 
mysticism and Western materia ism. 
But just as one generation affects 
round hats, and another prefers them 
three-cornered , so a fashion of the 
age promotes forgetfulness of the 
ethical requirement . I am well aware 
that every human being is more o r less 
one-sided, and I do no t regard it as a 
fault . But it is a fault when a fashion 
Wherever and however the ,olu-
tions are to be found , the truth 
remains that no one is free whc> will, 
not reflect. It is indeed iron ic . as 
psychologist Carl Jung has po inted 
out, that "in the West there is as 
great freedom politically as there 
is lack of it personally; whereas in 
the East we find just the opposite." 
According to an ancient myth. when 
Poverty and Plenty mated , Love 
was born. Perhaps when A pollo 
Linacre Quarterly 
98 
consents to dance with the Furies 
and the Furies permit themselves 
to bask in Apollo's sunlit reason-
ing, Truth and Peace will flower. 
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